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Daniel R. Orti
Of the three judges on the district court, Judge Kollar-Kotelly was
the most sympathetic to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
("BCRA").' She would have upheld all its central parts and have
struck down only three of its peripheral provisions: (1) those ban-
ning contributions from minors, (2) those forcing political parties to
choose between coordinated and independent spending for their
candidates, and (3) those requiring broadcasters to keep and disclose
particular records. Her opinion is also the most detailed and the
most grounded in evidence. That is not necessarily a virtue, of
course, if you believe, as Judge Henderson did, that the evidence was
either flawed or irrelevant. Most interestingly, Judge Kollar-Kotelly's
opinion is the most "realistic" of the three individual opinions. More
than the otherjudges, she tried to get at how the political process ac-
tually works and to understand the operation of BCRA's provisions in
that light. Such a pragmatic approach is good, of course, unless one
thinks she misunderstands politics. As Bob Bauer said in the first
panel, many are suspicious of any court's ability to really understand
it.
Despite its virtues, I think the opinion will have exactly the same
impact as the other judges', which is to say little to none. It is not go-
ing to affect greatly what the Supreme Court does. Certainly Justices,
like Scalia and Thomas, who believe that Buckley v. Vale2 was wrongly
decided and should be rethought from the bottom up, are not going
to be swayed by it. To anyone who is deeply suspicious of campaign
finance regulation, it will make no difference at all. To those Justices,
on the other hand, who are disposed to stay within the Buckley frame-
work or rethink it in the opposite direction, the opinion will offer
many arguments worthy of consideration and provide one possible
roadmap to decision. But, if only because it largely represents the
views of a single judge, Judge Kollar-Kotelly's opinion in no way man-
ages to present the case in a way that will structure the Supreme
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Court's decision making. For that matter, neither do the other
judges' opinions.
My job is to give an idea of what the opinion says about BCRA's
two central provisions-issue advocacy and soft money. And since
our panel is entitled "Critique," I will offer at the end some brief criti-
cism and suggest where Judge Kollar-Kotelly's opinion is most
vulnerable. My critique will be, for the most part, internal. I will ac-
cept most ofJudge Kollar-Kotelly's general understanding of the First
Amendment and then challenge her reasoning within that under-
standing. One could, of course, offer an external critique and criti-
cize from a different First Amendment perspective, much as Judge
Henderson did. Because that larger debate about First Amendment
principles is so vast and well-covered elsewhere, I will work within
Judge Kollar-Kotelly's own perspective.
BCRA took a novel approach to issue advocacy. Building on a line
of cases that allows government more power to regulate spending by
corporations and unions than by individuals, BCRA prohibited
spending on electioneering communications by the first group and
required only disclosure of such spending by the second. The critical
issue was one of coverage. What exactly does "electioneering com-
munication" comprehend? Congress had found that the "magic
words" test previously applied by the courts to distinguish express ad-
vocacy, which was regulable, from issue advocacy, which was not, was
unworkable. Under this test, any communication that did not con-
tain express words of advocacy like "vote for," "elect," "vote against,"
or "defeat" counted as an issue advertisement. The absence of a few
particular words, then, shifted speech from the regulated to the un-
regulated category and, predictably, corporations, unions, and indi-
vidual speakers tailored their campaign speech accordingly.
Congress took a new approach in BCRA. It first created a primary
definition of "electioneering communication." This definition carves
out those advertisements that (1) refer to a clearly identified candi-
date for federal office (2) on satellite, broadcast, or cable media (3)
within sixty days of a general or thirty days of a primary election while
(4) targeting the candidate's jurisdiction.4 Thus, a print ad appear-
ing seventy days before a federal election outside a candidate's dis-
trict would not be covered even if it expressly exhorted its audience
to vote for the particular candidate, while a television ad appearing
3 See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (upholding a Michigan
law prohibiting corporations from using corporate treasury funds for independent expendi-
tures in state elections); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (holding un-
constitutional a federal statute requiring corporations to make independent political contribu-
tions only through segregated funds, as applied to a nonprofit organization).
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twenty days before a federal election in a candidate's district would
be covered so long as it identified the candidate-even if it did not
request the audience to vote for or against him.
Judge Kollar-Kotelly found BCRA's primary definition of election-
eering communication constitutional. To my mind, the most impor-
tant strategic move in her opinion was getting beyond the "magic
words" test. Most other courts had suggested that the "magic words"
test was constitutionally required. These other courts, looking to
small passages in Buckley5 and Massachusetts Citizens For Life ("MCFL"),f
had found that without express words urging the defeat or election of
a candidate an ad escapes the traditional source and disclosure re-
quirements that apply to political spending. What Judge Kollar-
Kotelly pointed out was that these two Supreme Court cases nowhere
made magic words a constitutional requirement. Instead, she ar-
gued, the Supreme Court used the test only as an aid to statutory
construction. These express terms, she claimed, represented nothing
more than a narrowing construction of the actual statutory terms, a
construction that the Supreme Court adopted only in order to avoid
void-for-vagueness difficulties. She found no evidence that the Su-
preme Court believed the First Amendment required these words.
After making this move, Judge Kollar-Kotelly applied strict scru-
tiny. She inquired whether BCRA's handling of electioneering com-
munications under the primary definition was a narrowly tailored
means of achieving a compelling governmental purpose. No prob-
lem there, she found. The purpose here was preventing corruption
or the appearance of corruption, which the Supreme Court had long
held compelling. That part was easy. The narrow tailoring require-
ment, by contrast, required much more attention. This is where her
opinion gets very interesting and, to some people's minds, most
troubling. It relies extensively on the record and, in particular on
two Buying Time studies of advertising in the 1998 and 2000 elections.'
These reports surveyed television ads from the 1998 and 2000
election cycles and concluded that very few issue ads would be af-
fected by BCRA's primary definition. The 1998 study, for example,
concluded, in part, that only 7 percent of all issue ads televised that
year met BCRA's primary definition." Plaintiffs vigorously attacked
these studies-and still do. They are now claiming in the Supreme
Court, for example, that "the Buying Time reports were entirely and
5 424 U.S. at 41-44 & n,52.
6 479 U.S. at 248-50.
7 CRAIG B. HOLMAN & LUKE P. MCLOUGHLIN, BUYING TIME 2000: TELEVISION ADVERTISING
IN THE 2000 FEDERAL ELECTIONS (2001); JONATHAN S. KRASNO & DANIEL E. SELTZ, BUYING TIME:
TELEVISION ADVERTISING IN THE 1998 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS (2000).
9 KRASNO & SELTZ, supra note 7, at 109.
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irredeemably biased,"9 and that "the reports' conclusions about
BCRA's insignificant effect on so-called 'genuine' issue ads are in-
supportable."'0
Although Judge Kollar-Kotelly agreed that there were some prob-
lems with the Buying Time studies, she thought that the problems
were overall not serious. She described plaintiffs' attempts to dis-
credit the studies as "a pifiata party: if one hits the pifiata enough, it
will eventually crack apart."" But she thought that in the end the
plaintiffs had failed to crack the pifiata. Like Judge Leon, Judge Kol-
lar-Kotelly extensively relied on the studies' central findings. She also
thought the plaintiffs' failure to do any independent studies or even
to try to replicate the study they criticized highly significant:
Although some of [the pifiata] "hits" have merit.., neither Plaintiffs nor
[their expert] have attempted to conduct their own similar study, or even
replicate a discrete portion of the Buying Time studies, despite the fact
that the underlying materials were provided to them by Defendants. Pre-
senting the Court with contradictory results from such a study would have
been far more persuasive than the recalculations of incorrect versions of
the Buying Time data sets and the often conjectural and speculative criti-
cism proffered by Plaintiffs and [their expert].12
Judge Kollar-Kotelly also strongly rejected any claim of bias. "I
would not," she found, "discount the [Buying Time] studies because
they were approached with a particular result in mind. The testi-
mony shows that policy perspectives and effective scientific research
are not mutually exclusive. And, as to the particular actions which
Dr. Gibson, the Plaintiffs' expert, pointed to as evidence of bias-the
"cleaning" of data and recoding-Judge Kollar-Kotelly thought that
"[t]he 'cleaning' of the data that Dr. Gibson finds suspicious ap-
pears... to be a necessary function for databases of the size pro-
duced for the Buying Time reports and not the function of bias. Fix-
ing miscodings and resolving the 'cookie cutter' issues required such
actions. "0 4 She also noted that one of Dr. Gibson's major complaints
with the studies, his inability to reproduce their conclusions from the
underlying data sets, resulted from his own use of the wrong data
set."5 Judge Kollar-Kotelly believed that this confusion also "under-
9 Brief for Appellants/Cross Appellees Senator Mitch McConnell et al. at 53 n.18, McCon-
nell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C.) (three-judge court), prob. juris. noted, 123 S. Ct. 2268
(2003) (mem.).
10 Id. at 55.
11 251 F. Supp. 2d at 584 (Kollar-Kotelly,J.).
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. (citation omitted).
Id. ("[C]onfusion ... as to the correct database to use to analyze the studies' findings de-
creases the utility of Dr. Gibson's Expert Report. ... .") (citation omitted).
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mines the notion that the Buying Time authors manipulated the data
in order to achieve their desired results.
'' 6
Judge Kollar-Kotelly did not, however, accept the Buying Time
studies completely. In particular she declined to rely on that part of
the 1998 study concerning "the impact BCRA would have had on
genuine issue advertisements over the course of 1998 or within the
final days of the election.",7 Because of a controversy about the un-
derlying coding of data, she could not accept either side's view of this
issue. Similarly, because of what she identified as a difficulty in the
"authors' perceptions," she did not accept the 2000 study's conclu-
sion that "of all the issue advertisements run within 60 days of the
2000 election that mentioned a candidate, 0.6 percent were genuine
advertisements. "19 She did, however, accept as "the most conservative
calculation" the figure of 17 percent.:
°
Relying on these and other studies and other evidence presented
in the record, Judge Kollar-Kotelly found sufficient support for
BCRA's four-part primary definition of electioneering communica-
tion. She found (1) that most ads referring to clearly identified can-
didates promoted their election, not general issues; (2) that very few
genuine issue ads appeared in the sixty- and thirty-day periods before
general and primary elections; (3) that genuine issue advocacy within
those periods would be ineffective in framing the terms of debate on
general issues; (4) that since advertising gets more expensive the
closer it appears to an election, speakers who want to sway opinion on
issues rather than on candidates would want to advertise outside of
BCRA's time frames anyway; and (5) that BRCA's targeting prong
worked well to separate out issue advocacy from advocacy designed to
support particular candidates. Best of all, she thought, the BCRA fac-
tors had the advantage of objectivity. By avoiding inquiry into the
subjective understanding of the audience and the subjective intent of
the speaker, they skirted First Amendment danger. As she put it,
"[b]ased on the extensive evidence presented in the record, it is en-
tirely possible to distinguish pure issue advocacy from candidate-
centered issue advocacy without relying on the listener/viewer at-
tempting to discern the 'true' intent of the advertisement."
2'
Since the other two judges disagreed with this conclusion, it is not
part of the district court's holding. Judge Leon's view was the pivotal
one here. He found BCRA's primary definition of electioneering
16 Id. at 584-85.
7 Id. at 585.
'8 Id.
19 Id. at 586.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 587.
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communications unconstitutionally overbroad. At the same time,
however, he found that BCRA's backup definition (severed of one
part) was constitutional. Presumably in order to provide a court ma-
jority, Judge Kollar-Kotelly later agreed with Judge Leon's view that
the modified backup provision passed muster. But she did so without
real discussion. That is a real weakness in her opinion, for Judge
Leon's modified backup provision turned out to be broader than the
primary definition itselfl
The only remaining question was how spending for electioneering
communications could be treated. BCRA basically said that individu-
als could spend for this kind of advertising without limit subject to
disclosure. By contrast, it completely barred business corporations
and unions and any other corporation that received money from
them from engaging in this kind of spending. Judge Kollar-Kotelly
believed there was only one real issue: whether applying the law to
so-called MCFL corporations invalidated it. These are corporations
more akin to "voluntary political associations than business firms."
2
In particular, they must satisfy three conditions: (1) they must be
"formed for the express purpose of promoting political ideas, and
cannot engage in business activities"; (2) they must have no "share-
holders or other persons affiliated so as to have a claim on its assets
or earnings"; and (3) they must be independent "from the influence
of business corporations."23 Judge Kollar-Kotelly found that barring
MCFL corporations that receive money from business corporations
and unions from spending on electioneering communication did not
facially violate the First Amendment. She did leave open, however,
the possibility that as applied to particular MCFL corporations,
BCRA's ban might pose troubling First Amendment issues, which
would need to be raised and considered in subsequent suits.
Judge Kollar-Kotelly's approach to BCRA's soft money provisions
was even more straightforward. She saw them "as a fund raising re-
striction aimed at restructuring the failed allocation regime that has
produced a campaign finance system so riddled with loopholes as to
be rendered ineffective." 24 Applying Buckley v. Valeo, she found that
soft money was a form of contribution, not of expenditure, and so
was subject to something less than strict scrutiny. A law regulating
contributions, she said, must be "'closely drawn' to match a 'suffi-
ciently important interest.'
2 5
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 661 (1990) (quoting FEC v. Mass.
Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 263 (1986)).
23 Id. at 662-64.
24 McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 652 (Kollar-KotellyJ.).
25 Id. at 664.
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As before, she found an important governmental purpose in pre-
venting corruption and the appearance of corruption and also in
preventing circumvention of valid contribution limits. And again,
looking to the record, she found much to support that purpose. Poli-
ticians, she found, knew who gave money to their parties, particularly
when it was informally credited to them individually. This allowed
donors to obtain special access, which she considered a form of cor-
ruption. People often give to political parties to get something in re-
turn, she thought, rather than just to get their favorite candidates
elected. Judge Kollar-Kotelly also found that the soft money provi-
sions were narrowly tailored "because [they permit] federal candi-
dates and officeholders to... fully participate in the political process,
but closely circumscrib[e] their activities to prevent the kinds of
problems that developed with their solicitation of nonfederal
funds."2 6 And finally, she dodged one issue that will become impor-
tant later: whether federalism principles allow Congress to regulate
some soft money practices of state political parties. She believed that
none of the parties before the district court had standing to raise this
particular claim.2 ' Only the states, she thought, could.
There are four particular places where some will criticize Judge
Kollar-Kotelly's work. First, some will complain of her reliance on the
Buying Time studies, especially since she herself faulted them in
places. In her defense, she would argue that she relied on the studies
only where she thought them reliable and relevant and that in most
instances other uncontroverted studies or expert testimony backed
them up. Second, her failure to justify her finding that Judge Leon's
modified version of BCRA's backup definition of electioneering
communications was constitutional is a major failing. She accepted
Judge Leon's justification uncritically but his reasoning is fairly weak.
Perhaps Judge Kollar-Kotelly felt that a rule backed by a majority of
the court was necessary on this issue but that the less said about this
particular rule the better. Third, when she discusses the treatment of
electioneering communications (as opposed to their definition), she
really sees only a single issue: whether BCRA has to cut loose all
MCFL corporations. She largely overlooks other possible issues, like
whether requiring MCFL corporations to accept funds for such
spending only from individuals and then requiring them to carefully
segregate those funds within the corporation might represent a less
restrictive means of preventing corruption or its appearance. Finally,
as for the soft money provisions, Judge Kollar-Kotelly pushes things a
bit. She sees obtaining access as a type of corruption. That may be
right but the Supreme Court has not yet moved so far.
2 Id. at 707-08.
2 Id. at 712.
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